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Diversity Functions and the Value of Biodiversity
Hans-Peter Weikard
ABSTRACT. Biodiversity loss has been recog-
nized as one of the most important global envi-
ronmental problems, but the choice of conser-
vation policies is hampered by the lack of an
operational concept of biodiversity. Weitzman
(1992, 1998) develops a framework for the mea-
surement of diversity and the identi cation of
cost-effective policies for the preservation of bio-
diversity. Weitzman’s framework has been criti-
cized as being unsuitable for the global problem
of biodiversity loss. This paper responds to this
critique. It is shown that Weitzman’s framework
of diversity measurement can be made practical
and applicable by shifting the level analysis from
species to ecosystems. (JEL Q38, D81)
I. INTRODUCTION
Biodiversity loss has become a pressing
global environmental problem. It may de-
stabilize the ecosystem, it reduces potential
sources of food, the chances to discover use-
ful pharmaceuticals, and the aesthetic value
of nature.1 We obtain very different bene ts
from nature conservation and it is hard to dis-
entangle the issues involved. As it stands bio-
diversity is a vague concept and it does not
offer much guidance for the design of con-
servation policies.What is called for is a con-
ceptual framework for the assessment of the
value of biodiversity and operational con-
cepts for the assessmentof conservation poli-
cies. Even if the value of biodiversity cannot
actually be measured (e.g., in money terms),
because in practice it is hard to make dif-
ferent values commensurable, a conceptual
framework would help to clarify the issues
and lead us some way toward an operational
de nition of biodiversity. Seminal work by
Martin Weitzman (1992, 1998) has prepared
the ground. Weitzman (1992) introduces the
concept of a diversity function. The funda-
mental idea is that the diversity of a set of
species is a function of the dissimilarity of
the species in the set. A diversity function at-
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taches a diversity value to every conceivable
set of biological species. Weitzman (1993)
suggests the use of genetic information to de-
termine the dissimilarity between species and
shows how policy recommendations can be
derived for a family of 15 species of cranes.2
Given the genetic information, estimates of
the survival probabilities and of the marginal
costs of ‘‘producing’’ survival probability
are suf cient to determine how conservation
resources should be allocated to protect ge-
netic diversity in the best possible way. The
diversity function approach gives a clear-cut
answer to the conservationist’s resource allo-
cation problem, if genetic diversity is to be
maximized. Of course, the diversity value is
only one aspect of the value of conservation.
Some species will have value independently
of what they contribute to diversity. Weitz-
man (1998) accounts for that by introduc-
ing species value into his framework. Thus,
he provides a solution to the ‘‘Problem of
Noah’s Ark’’: Which species should be taken
on board and be protected when the ark is of
limited size and not large enough to save all?
While Weitzman’s framework seems to be
a large step forward toward a rational design
of conservation policies, it is not free from
problems. Recently, Mainwaring (2001) has
raised two important points of criticism.
First, ameasurementof biodiversity based on
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1 See United Nations Environment Programme
(1995) and Perrings et al. (1995) for a detailed account
of the various aspects of biodiversity loss; see Randall
(1993) for a discussion of philosophical views. Wilson
(1992) is a stimulating source for thinking about biodi-
versity.
2 Solow, Polasky, and Broadus (1993) have studied
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the genetic dissimilarity of species requires
more information than will ever be available.
Second, even if suf cient genetic informa-
tion were available, the question remains
whether the diversity measure thus obtained
captures the relevant values of diversity.
While this criticism is correct, it addresses
the application of biodiversity measurement
on the species level rather than the general
framework underlying Weitzman’s analysis.
This paper shows that information require-
ments can be met by shifting the level of ap-
plication from the preservation of species to
the preservation of ecosystems while the idea
of a diversity function is maintained. Amea-
sure of diversity of ecosystems captures the
values which drive our concern for main-
taining biodiversity.
Gowdy (1997) raises a more fundamen-
tal criticism of biodiversity measurement.
Gowdy argues that biodiversity is not substi-
tutable. Standardways of measuring its value
are, therefore, not available. Since a func-
tioning ecosystem is essential to the very
possibility of human lives, its services cannot
be traded for other goods. According to
Gowdy (1997, 27) we cannot attach a value
(be it total or marginal value) to an essential
resource. Similarly Mainwaring (2001, 81)
states that the substitution of ecosystem ser-
vices is beyond human capacity; examples of
non-substitutable services are: ‘‘the forma-
tion and retention of soils and the mainte-
nance of soil fertility via the nitrogen cycle
and the activity of micro-organisms; the
breakdown and recycling of organic matter
by micro-organisms; provision of fresh water
via the hydrological cycle;  ood control via
 ood-plains and wetlands; insect pollination
of food crops; pest control via natural preda-
tors; and the maintenance of a genetic li-
brary’’ (Mainwaring 2001, 81). Mainwaring
accepts to consider the contribution of indi-
vidual species or individual ecosystems to
ecosystem services, but he is doubtful of the
results obtained from such exercise. Gowdy
(1997, 37) takes a more radical view: ‘‘De-
vising a single measure, monetary or other-
wise, of the value of biodiversity, is impossi-
ble.’’ However, Gowdy’s argument proceeds
too quickly. That biodiversity is an essential
resource does not imply that any particular
species or ecosystem is also essential. The ir-
reversibility of species loss is not suf cient
for its essentiality.
The claim that we cannot value biodiver-
sity loss is simply false, because we do value
it. A valuation is always implicit in our deci-
sions affecting the survival probabilities of
ecosystems and species. By providing a con-
sistent operational framework, diversity the-
ory contributes to a clari cation of implicit,
hidden, and presumably, inconsistent valua-
tions. In order to implement a rational con-
servation policy, the value of the set of spe-
cies surviving under one policy must be
compared to the value of the set of species
surviving under another. Biodiversity mea-
surement is a necessity and we even have to
go beyond this. We do have to weigh biodi-
versity against other social goals. As long as
all essential ecosystem services can be pro-
vided, we may well trade ecosystems and
species for other goods, as we have done in
the past. The issue is rather that biodiversity
loss puts essential ecosystem services at risk.
Given our limited information and the cur-
rent pace of biodiversity loss, we cannot
be certain that a safe minimum standard is
maintained. To be sure, a valuation of essen-
tial (i.e., non-substitutable) ecosystem ser-
vices is impossible, since there are no trade-
offs for the decision-maker. Although, under
uncertainty, if there are no safe options, we
have to trade off the risk of losing one es-
sential resource against the risk of losing
another.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses whether or not
diversity is a relevant source of value in the
 rst place. Section 3 explains the concept of
a diversity function. Section 4 introduces the
main idea of the paper. In order to render the
diversity function approach practical and ap-
plicable, it should be concerned with the di-
versity of ecosystems, not with the diversity
of species. Section 5 concludes.
II. THE VALUE OF (GENETIC)
DIVERSITY
Biodiversity loss concerns different di-
mensions of value. First, the value of species
must be clearly distinguished from the value
of diversity. The value of diversity can be de-
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composed into components of instrumental
and intrinsic value.
Each species has a particular value: some
are sources of food, some offer transport ser-
vices, others can be used as a source for re-
newable energy or raw materials for various
purposes, and we enjoy the beauty of  owers
and butter ies. Biodiversity loss involves a
loss of species or, in case of within-species
diversity loss, it puts the survival of a species
at risk. In any case, one component of the
value of biodiversity is species value.
The instrumental value of biodiversity
cannot be attributed to particular species.
Ecosystem services like the provision of
fresh water or the fertility of soils rely essen-
tially on the interaction of different species.
Since there is evidence that species diversity
on average supports the stability of an eco-
system, diversity as such plays a crucial role
in providing these services.3 However, we
must carefully consider to what unit the con-
cept of diversity should be applied. Genetic
diversity seems to be relevant for an assess-
ment of within-species diversity which is a
decisive factor for species survival and the
potential for development in the evolutionary
process. A useful concept of between-species
diversity can hardly rely on genetic informa-
tion. Ecosystem services, for example, are
provided by chains of interacting species.
What is important, is the functional role of
different species in that interaction rather
than their genetic makeup.4A diverse sample
of species does not make a functioning eco-
system. Only for lack of knowledge of the
complex interactions in an ecosystemwe may
focus on maintaining species diversity in
order to maintain ecosystem services.
Maintaining diversity also provides an in-
surance of species value. It is reasonable to
rely on a mixed portfolio of species to ensure
the availability of food, raw materials, and
ecosystem services in an uncertain environ-
ment. This value of insurance is the option
value of biodiversity. Moreover, not only the
availability of particular sources of supply is
uncertain but also future demand. The future
demand for certain substances, e.g., for phar-
maceuticals, can hardly be predicted, since it
is generated by the results of future research
and our medical and bio-chemical knowl-
edge. The possibility of learning gives rise to
a quasi-option value of biodiversity.5 Like
ecosystem services, the option value and the
quasi-option value are instrumental diversity
values.
The intrinsic value of diversity captures
our preference for living in a more diverse
and stimulating environment, even if a less
diverse environment provides all essential
services and suf cient insurance. According
to Weitzman (1993, 158), ‘‘it seems that in-
creasingly many people believe that there is
some inherent value in preserving diversity,
even though they cannot exactly de ne what
it is.’’ This observation needs some further
comment. That increasingly many people at-
tach value to diversity may re ect an increas-
ing awareness of the importance of ecosys-
tem services. Moreover, genetic diversity as
such presumably does not mean much to
most people. An intrinsic value of diversity
is more plausible when it comes to observ-
able features of the different species. We en-
joy the diversity of shapes, colors, sounds,
and ways of life of the different species.
However, the diversity of the observable fea-
tures does not necessarily correspond to ge-
netic diversity. Genetically similar species
may be morphologically quite different and
vice versa. The claim that there is an intrinsic
value of diversity is too vague. The question
that needs to be addressed is: Diversity of
what?
III. THE CONCEPT OF A DIVERSITY
FUNCTION
There are many reasons for biological
conservation. The analysis proposed here is
based on the assumption that all values can
be traced back to a particular attribute of our
environment. These can be attributes of a sin-
gle organism (e.g., the capability to produce
a useful substance) or attributes that are in-
corporated in the interaction of different or-
ganisms (e.g., the fertility of soils).6 A focus
3 McCann (2000) provides a survey of the diversity-
stability debate.
4 An example can be found in Mainwaring (2001,
88).
5 Cf. Bishop and Woodward (1995) and Ready
(1995) for surveys.
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on the protection of species can be justi ed
only if individuals belonging to the same
species have essentially the same attributes.
This condition implies that one individual
can be replaced by another of the same spe-
cies while all the relevant attributes are main-
tained. A concernaboutbiodiversity is a con-
cern about the attributes that are incorporated
in an environment with many species. If an
environment is rich in terms of biodiversity,
it offers more valuable attributes. A poor
environment offers less than necessary to
survive.
The analysis starts with two observations.
First, there seems to be unanimous agree-
ment that biodiversity is desirable. Second,
the concern of environmentalists, scientists,
and policy makers is to prevent biodiversity
loss. It is implicitly acknowledged in this
concern that biodiversity is a quanti able
concept. The environmentmay offer more or
less biodiversity, and we can, in principle,
compare possible states (of a region, a coun-
try, or planet earth) in terms of biodiversity.
Given the observations just mentioned, it
makes sense to say that the environment un-
der one policy offers more (or less) biodiver-
sity than under another policy. Each policy
brings about a certain state of nature and
these states can be ordered in terms of bio-
diversity. Thus, without being committed to
a speci c content of ‘‘biodiversity,’’ we have
the following structural framework:
Let W be the set of all possible states of
nature and let be a diversity ordering. For-
mally, we require that is a weak ordering
on W.7 We can now state the following de -
nition:
Definition 1. For all states of nature w,
w¢ Î W, w w¢ if and only if state w offers
at least as much diversity as state w¢.
It is often convenient to represent by a
non-negative real valued function. Such rep-
resentation is called a diversity function.
Definition 2: A diversity function is a map-
ping D: W ® 1 such that for all w, w¢ Î
W, D(w)$ D(w¢) if and only if w w¢.
De nitions 1 and 2 are very general.
Weitzman’s (1992) theory of diversity de-
 nes a structure for diversity functions. He
explains this theory discussing the example
of diversity of species.8 A state of nature
w can be identi ed with the set of species
which exist in this state. Let w0 be the set of
all initially existing species. Weitzman’s
basic idea is that the diversity of a set of spe-
cies depends on their dissimilarity. In other
words, a measure of diversity of a set of spe-
cies is an aggregate of the dissimilarity of the
species in the set. As ameasure of dissimilar-
ity Weitzman (1992, 1993) suggests to use
taxonomic or genetic information. Such in-
formation can be expressed by a distance
function which gives the (genetic) distance
between any two species in the initial set of
species. Formally, a distance function satis-
 es the following requirements:
Definition 3. A distance function is a map-
ping d: w0 3 w0 ® 1 such that
d(x, x)5 0 for all xÎ w0,
d(x, y)5 d(y, x). 0 for all x, yÎ w0, and x¹ y, and
d(x, y)# d(x, z)1 d(z, y) for all x, y, zÎ w0.
The next step of Weitzman’s (1992)
analysis is to de ne the dissimilarity d(x, w)
between a species x and a set of species w.
As a measure of dissimilarity, Weitzman
uses the standard de nition of the distance
between a point and a set of points:9
Definition 4. For all w Ì w0 and all xÎ w0
w, d(x, w) 5 min
yÎw
d(x, y)
6 Nehring and Puppe (1999) develop a ‘‘multi-attri-
bute approach to valuing diversity’’ which generalizes
Weitzman’s approach to the measurement of diversity.
7 A weak ordering is a transitive and complete bi-
nary relation.
8 Weitzman (1992, 364) says: ‘‘in what follows I
shall employ largely biological metaphors.’’ This
leaves room for different interpretations and applica-
tions. Weitzman (1998, 1279 f) explitcitly states: ‘‘In
principle, the basic unit could be at the level of the mol-
ecule, cell, organ, individual, species, habitat, ecosys-
tem, or so forth.’’
9 Cf. Weikard (1998) for a discussion of dissimilar-
ity as distance.
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Finally, Weitzman takes distance d(x, w)
to measure the diversity difference between a
set of species w and an enlarged setw {x},
where species x (xÏ w) is added tow. Weitz-
man’s diversity function D(w) is recursively
de ned as follows:
Definition 5. (i) For all x Î w0, D({x}) 5
D0, D0 Î 1; and (ii) for all w Ì w0 and all
x Î w0, D(w {x}) 5 D(w) 1 d(x, w).10
In a later study Weitzman (1993) applies
this framework to measure the diversity of a
family of 15 species of cranes. If diversity is
considered to be valuable, then Weitzman’s
measurement can serve as a basis for conser-
vation policies. It is important to note, how-
ever, that the idea of a diversity function is
more general. In general an operational con-
cept of diversity must rely on some mea-
sure of dissimilarity between appropriately
de ned objects. Species diversity is just one
special case. The remainder of the paper ex-
plores the application of diversity theory to
ecosystems.
IV. BIODIVERSITY AS DIVERSITY
OF ECOSYSTEMS
In a recent criticism of Weitzman’s ap-
proach to diversity measurementMainwaring
(2001, 79) stresses the fact that the genetic
information necessary to make the approach
work will never be available. So far biolo-
gists have described no more than 1.75 mil-
lion of some 13 million species that may ex-
ist.11 Even for most of the known species we
are far from knowing their genetic structure.
Since biodiversity loss is an urgent concern
and the huge taxonomic task is impossible to
complete, the diversity function approach
is restricted to very small subsets of spe-
cies (like the family of cranes, for example).
Looking at small subsets, however, cannot
solve the problem and may even shift the fo-
cus in the wrong direction. An optimal pres-
ervation with regard to one small set of spe-
cies may not be optimal when the biosphere
as awhole is at stake.Thuswe cannotwaitun-
til all the necessary information is gathered,
but we also cannot act on partial informa-
tion. Mainwaring (2001, 90) tentatively sug-
gests that diversity measures can be applied
to habitats and ecosystems.12 In the remain-
der of the paper I explore this possibility.
The  rst step is to give an operational
de nition of an ecosystem. An ecosystem is:
1. a geographically identi able region;
2. hosting a set of (interacting) species;
3. and it is viable without (or with lim-
ited) biological exchange with other
ecosystems.
There are twoways ecosystems can be de-
scribed using easily observable characteris-
tics: (1) soil and climate conditions; and (2)
random samples of species. Presumably two
ecosystems with similar conditions will ac-
commodate similar sets of species. There-
fore, in order to explain the main ideas of the
paper I focus on information of type 2. The
aim is to present a measure of diversity of a
collection of different ecosystems based on
(incomplete) information about the species in
each ecosystem.
Along the lines of Section 2 we  rst de ne
a measure of dissimilarity between two eco-
systems. As a measure of dissimilarity serves
the number of species contained in one eco-
system and not contained in the other. To
state this formally, we use the notation al-
ready introduced: w0 is the set of all existing
species. W is the set of all ecosystems e
(which are subsets of the set of all species).
Formally, W is de ned to be the set of all
non-empty subsets of w0. Then the formal
de nition of dissimilarity d(e, e¢) between
two ecosystems e, e¢ Î W is as follows:
Definition 3¢. For all e, e¢ Î W, d(e, e¢)5
#e 2 #(e e¢),
where #e denotes the number of species in
ecosystem e (cf. Weitzman 1998, 1289).13
10 De nition 5 is only adequate for the special case
of taxonomic trees. In the general case, part (ii) of
De nition 5 must be replaced by D(w) 5 maxxÎw
D(w\{x}) 1 d(x, w); cf. Weitzman (1992, 375).
11 Mainwaring (2001, 79) notes that estimates of the
total number of species range between 3.5 million and
more than 100 million species.
12 Weitzman also (1998, 1280) mentions this pos-
siblity, but does not pursue it.
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De nition 3¢ can be extended in a natural
way to de ne the dissimilarity of an ecosys-
tem and an arbitrary collection of ecosystems
w 5 {e1, e2, . . . }, ei Î W. The dissimilarity
between ecosystem e and a collection of eco-
systems w is de ned as the numberof species
contained in ecosystem e and not contained
in any of the ecosystems in the collection w.
This is formally stated as follows:
Definition 4¢: For all e Î W and all w Í
W, d(e, w) 5 #e 2 #(e
e iÎw
ei).14
This de nition of dissimilarity leads to the
following diversity function. The diversity of
a set of ecosystems w is denoted D(w); it is
recursively de ned by:
Definition 5¢: (i) For all e Î W, D({e}) 5
#e, and (ii) for all w Í W and all e Î W, 5
D(w {e}) 5 D(w) 1 d(e, w).
The following proposition holds:
P roposition 1: The diversity value of a col-
lection of ecosystems D(w) is equal to the
number of different species in all ecosystems
in w.
Proof: Let wn 5 {e1, . . . , en} be an arbitrary
collection of ecosystems. We have to show
that for arbitrary n D(wn) 5 #
i51,...,n
ei. The
proof is by induction.
For n 5 1 this holds by part (i) of de ni-
tion 3: D(w1) 5 D({e1}) 5 #e1.
By de nitions 2 and 3, D(wn11) 5
# i51,...,n ei 1 #en11 2 #(en11 i51,...,n ei).
Therefore, D(wn11) 5 # i51,...,n11 ei × QED.
Proposition 1 corroborates the intuitively
appealing idea that a comparison of diversity
across ecosystems can rely on counting spe-
cies. By contrast, Weitzman’s (1998) mea-
sure of diversity of species, that is, diversity
in an ecosystem, relies on counting genes.15
Proposition 1 tells us that the number of spe-
cies serves well as a  rst approximation of
diversity given the limited information avail-
able. This provides grounding for the intui-
tion that as many species as possible should
be saved in order to minimize biodiversity
loss. A cost effective conservation policy is
a policy whichmaximizes the numberof spe-
cies subject to a given budget constraint.
The operational framework I have just
sketched out is practical and applicable. The
biological information input required is the
following:
1. A speci cation of the set of existing
ecosystems. The design of a conserva-
tion policy must start with an inventory
of ecosystems. On a regional level eco-
systems like coastal areas, wetlands,
various types of agri-ecosystems, and
so forth can be identi ed. Conservation
programs on a larger scale must rely
on a broader classi cation, if no inven-
tories exist. For conservation on the
global level, a  rst rough result could
be obtained on a low level of precision,
using very broadly characterized eco-
systems such as the rain forest, Siberia,
Australia, or Central European agricul-
tural regions.
2. An estimate of the number of species
in each ecosystem.
3. Information about the dissimilarity of
ecosystems generated from randomly
drawn samples of species from each
ecosystem. This information is suf -
cient to identify the most important
ecosystems in terms of diversity value
and it gives an indication how to allo-
cate conservation resources. For a full
analysis of cost effectiveness of con-
servation policies additional informa-
tion is needed.
4. An estimate of protection costs for
each ecosystem.
Under uncertainty we cannot fully control
whether a species will survive or not and
whether an ecosystem will stay intact or not.
13 Note that the dissimilarity relation is not symmet-
ric; only if it is the case that #e 5 #e¢, then d(e, e¢ ) 5
d(e¢, e).
14 De nition 4¢ is much simpler special case of
Weitzman’s (1992, 375-84) general approach to diver-
sity measurement; see footnote 10. It also differs from
the de nition given by Weitzman (1998, 1290) where
he focuses on taxonomic trees.
15 Nehring and Puppe (1999) de ne the diversity of
a set of objects as a weighted sum of the relevant attri-
butes of the objects in the set.
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Conservation measures affect the probabili-
ties of species extinction and ecosystem loss.
Weitzman (1998) derives the expected diver-
sity value on the basis of the assumption of
independent survival probabilities for spe-
cies. This assumption is criticized by Main-
waring (2001, 88-89). The interdependence
of the various species is the essence of an
ecosystem. The loss of one species may well
trigger the loss of additional species. As-
suming independent survival probabilities
gravely misrepresents a central feature of the
ecosystem. This criticism is valid with regard
to the diversity of species. If, as I have sug-
gested, diversity theory is applied to eco-
systems, the independence of probabilities
of ecosystem loss is a plausible assumption,
since ecosystems are geographically segre-
gated and ex denitione viable without ex-
change.16 The assumption of independent
probabilities is important for a practicable
analysis. Even if Weitzman’s model would
be generalized to account for dependent sur-
vival probabilities it would be impossible to
empirically estimate the relevant relation-
ships. The informational requirements about
the interactions within an ecosystem would
be too large.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A rational design of conservation policies
requires an operational framework, a mea-
surable concept of biodiversity. So far, the
discussion has focused on the diversity of
species. But for reasons of information con-
straints this approach does not seem to be
promising. Using Weitzman’s general frame-
work of diversity measurement, I propose to
use ecosystem diversity as a guideline for im-
mediate and urgently required conservation
policies. It is shown in the paper that the pro-
posed measure of ecosystem diversity boils
down to counting species. A pragmatic con-
servation policy, thus, aims at maximizing
the (expected) number of species under a
given budget constraint. Furthermore, it is
argued that the protection of ecosystem di-
versity is broadly in line with the concerns
underlying the biodiversity debate: the main-
tenance of a high species value including in-
surance against the loss of species and the
maintenance of ecosystem services.
The paper addresses the design of conser-
vation policies assuming a given budget con-
straint. To determine the size of the budget
to be set aside for conservation is a matter
that goes beyond the scope of this paper. In-
deed, the problem of Noah’s ark, which spe-
cies will be given a place on the ark, is only
one of two problems that Noah faces. It is a
second-stage problem.At the  rst stage Noah
must make up his mind about how much
space on the ark he wants for himself.
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